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329. If the contract is one which the corporation could not adopt the
promoters are personally liable. Marshalltown First National Bank v.
Church Federation of America (1906), 129 Iowa 268, 105 N. W. 578. But see
Durgin v. Smith (1903), 133 Mich. 331, 94 N. W. 1044, where it was held
that even where the contract was not binding on the proposed corporation,
the promoters are not liable. Where, in such cases, there is an absence of
stipulation as to liability in the contract between promoters and third
parties the promoters are usually held liable. Kelner v. Baxter (1866),
L. R. 2 C. P. 174; Martin v. Fewell (1883), 79 Mo. 401; Munson v. Syracuse
G. and C. R. Co. (1886), 103 N. Y. 58, 8 N. E. 355. M. E. C., '29.
HABEAs CoRPuS-ExIsTENcE OF REMEDY BY APPEAL OR WRIT OF ERROR-
JURIsDICTION.-Defendant was charged with having intoxicating liquor in
his possession. He pleaded guilty, was sentenced to six months in jail,
Bell. None of these courts has declared a sterilization statute to be in
was insufficient in that it did not specify the date upon which the alleged
crime was committed. His appeal bond seemed to have been disallowed.
After the time allowed for appeal had expired, defendant sued out this writ
of habeas corpus. The court issued the writ and on the hearing discharged
the defendant from custody. Ex parte Syndor (Mo., 1928), 10 S. W. (2d)
63.
From the face of this decision, it seems that the court deviated from the
ironclad rule that a writ of habeas corpus will be issued only to test the
jurisdiction of the court which committed the prisoner. This rule is fol-
lowed in nearly every state of the union. Henry v. Henkel (1914), 235
U. S. 219; People v. Zimmer (1911), 252 Ill. 9, 96 N. E. 529; Ex parte
Mason (1884), 16 Mo. A. 41; State v. Dobson (1896), 135 Mo. 1, 36 S. W.
238; People v. Hanley (1921), 191 N. Y. S. 501; Ex parte O'Connor (1915),
29 Cal. A. 225, 155 P. 115. Nor will a writ of habeas corpus issue in lieu
of an appeal or writ of error. In re Lincoln (1906), 202 U. S. 178; Peo-
ple v. Murphy (1904), 212 Ill. 584, 72 N. E. 902; In re Lewis (1900), 124
Mich. 199, 82 N. W. 816. The court justifies its opinion, however, by ex-
pressly holding that a faulty information is a nullity, and that the court
acquires no jurisdiction thereunder; and that since the court had no juris-
diction, and an appeal could no longer be brought, the writ of habeas corpus
was rightfully issued and the defendant rightfully discharged.
But is the mere omission of the date of the crime an essential defect?
It seems not. State v. Myrberg (1909), 56 Wash. 384, 105 P. 622; State
v. Hurley (1912), 242 Mo. 452, 146 S. W. 1154; Walker v. State (1912), 12
Ga. A. 91, 76 S. E. 762; Colwell v. State (1916), 17 Ga. A. 750, 88 S. E.
410; Ex parte Mitchum (1922), 91 Tex. Cr. R. 62, 237 S. W. 936. The
above cases and many others agree that where time is not of the essence
of crime charged, it is immaterial.
Since the omission of time in the indictment is a mere formal requisite,
it may be waived, either by express or implied waiver. In the principal
Washington University Open Scholarship
COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
case a waiver should have been implied from the defendant's failure to
demur or file a motion to quash, People v. England (1912), 170 Ill. A. 587;
Green v. Commonwealth (1915), 164 Ky. 396, 175 S. W. 665.
Hence it is seen that the court in the principal case stretched the law to
disproportion in order to set the defendant free. S. M. W., '29.
MASTER AND SERVANT-CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT AT YEARLY SALARY
DETERMINABLE AT WIL.-Defendant cabled plaintiff in Sweden to become
superintendent of his veneer plant in the State of Washington at an an-
nual salary of $6,000. Upon plaintiff's arrival in New York, he was in-
formed that his services were not needed. Held, that this type of contract
constitutes an employment for an indefinite period and may be abandoned
at will by either party without resulting liability. Davidson v. Afackall-
Paine Veneer Co. (Wash., 1928), 271 P. 878.
Although not in accord with decisions of early English cases, the princi-
pal case is clearly in line with the trend of modern authority. Wood,
MASTER AND SERVANT, 2d ed., sec. 136, at p. 282, gives an accurate survey of
and fined $200.00. He later appealed on the ground that the information
held that a general hiring or a hiring by the terms of which no time is
fixed is a hiring for a year and that rule applies to all contracts of hiring
and service, Lilly v. Elwin (1848), 11 Q. B. 742; Fawcett v. Cash (1834),
5 B. & Ad. 904, except where there is some custom relating to the matter in
reference to which the parties are presumed to have contracted, or where
the terms of the contract or the nature of the service is such as to rebut
the presumption that a yearly hiring was intended. But according to Eng-
lish decisions, such general hiring is merely presumed to be a hiring for a
year and may be rebutted by proof or even by other presumptions raised by
circumstances surrounding the transaction. Williams v. Byrne (1837), 7
Ad. & E. 177; Baxter v. Nurse (1844), 6 Man. & G. 935. So where either
party reserves the right to put an end to the contract at any time, Rex. v.
Bowden (1827), 7 B. & C. 249; or if the master does not have entire con-
trol over the servant during the specified period, Queen v. Ravenstonedale
(1840), 12 Ad. & E. 73.
"In the United States the rule is inflexible that a general or indefinite
hiring is prima facie a hiring at will. A hiring at so much a day, week,
month, or year, no time being specified, is an indefinite hiring and no pre-
sumption arises that it was even for a day, but only at the rate fixed for
the services actually rendered. It is competent for either party to show
what their mutual understanding was concerning the contract in question."
Similar language may be found in Labatt, MASTER AND SERVANT, 2d ed.,
see. 159, in which he states: "The doctrine applied by the great majority of
courts which have so far [1913] expressed an opinion on the subject, con-
sists essentially in a complete repudiation of the presumption that a general
or indefinite hiring is the hiring for a year, and the substitution of another
presumption, viz., that such a hiring is one at will. Under this doctrine, the
burden of proving that such hiring was obligatory for a year rests on the
party who seeks to establish that the contract covered that period."
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